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COMMENTS
ATTORNEY'S FEES-SHOULD THEY BE TAXED
AS COSTS?
A recent Florida statute enables a petition for the dissolution of a
solvent corporation where two equal opposing ownership interests are
dead-locked.' The statute has not however, provided for the payment
of attorney's fees2 and the problem of whether or not the corporation
assets should be charged with the successful petitioner's attorney's fees
is bound to arise.
Mindful of the dicta of the United States Supreme Court when
speaking in regard to allowance by a court of equity of counsel fees
not included in the ordinary taxable costs recognized by statute, that
* such allowances are appropriate only in exceptional cases and
for dominating reasons of justice ... ," we intend to clearly show that
the situation necessary for the invocation of this statute presents just
such an exceptional case; further, that it is closely analogous to several
classes of cases wherein equity has invoked its inherent power to allow
attorney's fees.
ALLOWANCE OF ATIronNly's FEES IN GE.NERAL
The present policy of our judicial system against awarding attorney's
fees to the successful litigant has been under heavy criticism by legal
writers for the past quarter-century. 4  There has, however, been very
little in the way of legislative and judicial response to this criticism.
1. FLA. STAT. § 608.28 (1953):
When the number of directors of any corporation is even and they
are equally divided respecting the management of the corporation and the
total stock voting power is equally divided into two independent ownerships
or interests with one part favoring the course advocated by one half of
the directors and one part favoring the course of the other half, or
the holders of the two halves of stock voting power are unable to agree
on the election of a board of directors, consisting of an uneven number,
the circuit court, sitting in chancery, may entertain a petition for involuntary
dissolution of the corporation .. ..
2. The only provision for the payment of fees and costs in FLA. STAT. § 608.28
(1953) is "The fees and costs provided by § 608.27 shall be paid by the receiver
or trustee from corporate funds." The provision in § 608.27 as to fees and costs
provides, "Upon the . . . payment by the corporation of the cost of publication
and the fee required by § 608.05(4) the corporation shall be dissolved. § 608.05(4)
provides only for the payment of fees to the Secretary of State.
3. Spraque v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U.S. 777, 780 (1939).
4. See Coodhart, Costs, 38 YA.LE L. 1. 849 (1929); McCormick, Counsel
Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation As An Element of Damages, 15 MNN. L. REv.
619 (1931); Comment, 44 ILL. L. REV. 507 (1950).
Costs. 44 ILL. L. REV. 507 (1950),
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The dicta of some of the cases in which this issue has arisen, and
some of the writers on this topic,0 appear to hold the view that our
jurisprudence has never countenanced the inclusion of attorney's fees
in taxable costs. The history of the matter discloses quite a contrary
notion.
It is quite true that during the earliest years of the growth of our
legal system lawyers were held in great disrepute by courts and laymen
alike.7 In some of the colonies, lawyers were even forbidden to receive
fees from their own clients.8 It is highly improbable that in the existence
of such an atmosphere the issue of including attorney's fees in costs would
even arise.
However, the earliest statutes concerning court procedure clearly
evince an intent to charge the unsuccessful litigant with the counsel fees
necessary for his successful adversary's prosecution (or defense) of the
litigation.9 In point of fact, the establishment and growth of the
present policy against awarding attorney's fees appears to be quite accidental
in nature; perhaps, indeed, a mistake in its very inception.
These statutes provided for an award to the successful litigant
of certain specified amounts for the various procedural steps necessary
in the prosecution of the action. 10  The amounts stipulated, were, at
the time of their enactment, very close in amount to the actual fees
which attorneys were receiving.
The contention that the early policy was directly opposed to the
present one is further bulwarkcd by the fact that most of our early
jurisprudence was imported, or cngrafted, from the English system.
English law has from very early times awarded attorney's fees as costs
taxable against the losing party."
In any event, the inflexible method utilized by the statutes (a fixed
sum per stipulated service), combined with the rapid early economic
growth of our nation, quickly retcgatcd what were formerly awards of
reasonable fees to the role of mere formalities. It does not appear why the
respective legislatures did not enact further statutes to perpetuate the system.
The cases, however, clearly show that the judiciary has long considered the
area one proper only for legislative activity,12 and have held that in
5. See Manko v. Buffalo, 65 N.Y.S.2d 128, 143 (1946).
6. See Satterthwaite, Increasing Costs to be Paid by Losing Party, 46 N.J.L.J.
133 (1923).
7. WARReN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 4 (1913).
8. Ibid.
9. N.Y. Rv. STAT. C. 10, § 4 (1829). VIRGINIA LAWS c. 6, § 14 (1745).
10. Ibid.
11. Sandback v. Thomas, I Stark. 306, 171 Eng. Rep. 481 (1816). See 2
DANIELL, CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE, § 1376-1440 (6 Am. ed. 1894).
12. Marks v. Leo Teist, Inc., 8 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1925); Ritter v. Ritter, 381
111. 549, 46 N.E.2d 41 (1943); Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 286 II. 564, 122
N.E. 55 (1919).
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cases at law, the taxable "costs" provided for by statute mark the limits
for recovery of the expenses of litigation.'3
Thus, today, except in various limited areas of exception, the rule
that attorney's fees are not recoverable is well established.
Various reasons for and against the present policy have been espoused,'14
but the basic problem resolves into the conflict of two diametrically
opposed philosophies of the nature of costs. There is, on the one
hand, the view that costs are a penalty imposed upon the unsuccessful
("unfortunate") litigant,15 and, on the other, that costs are an expense
incidental to the litigation presumably necessitated by the legal wrong of
the failing litigant, and therefore rightly chargeable to him.'8
Those who hold to the former view reason that the imposition
of heavier costs by the inclusion of attorney's fees would deter the
prosecution of meritorious claims due to the prospect of having to pay
an onerous amount if for some unforeseen reason the suit is unsuccessful.' 7
Those who advocate a change in the present policy reason that the
prospect of having to pay the "actual costs" of litigation will deter the
initiation of spurious actions and the interposition of non-meritorious
defenses.'8
At present, no trend is readily discernible concerning the future of
the rule. Without delving too deeply into the controversy, it suffices
at this point to conclude that a strict adherence to the rule, indiscriminate
of the equities of particular cases, or classes thereof, to which the arguments
and reasoning above are peculiarly inapplicable, works grave injustices.
Evidencing an awareness of this, the various legislatures have built
up several areas of exception to the general rule. Under the police power,
statutes in most states now provide for the allowance of attorney's fees
to successful plaintiffs in proceedings against certain classes of defendants
such as railroads and insurance companies.' 9 A much more important
area of exception is found in legislation authorizing such allowances in
actions which, by their nature, present situations where an application
of the general policy against the award of attorney's fees would clearly
work inequities. Florida, for example, has by statute provided for the
allowance of attorney's fees in actions to partition realty,20 partition
13. Macri v. City of Bremerton, 111 P.2d 612 (Wash. 1941); Parker v.
Mecklenburg Realty and Ins. Co., 195 N.C. 644, 143 S.E. 254 (1928); Patterson v.
Northern Trust Co., 286 I1. 564, 122 N.E. 55 (1919).
14. See Note, 15 U. oF CIN. L. REv. 313, 314, for a rather thorough discussion
of the various arguments which have been expounded.
15. See note 6 supra.
16. See note 4 supra.
17. See note 6 supra.
18. See note 4 suprd.
19. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 356.04 (1953) (railroads); FLA. STAT. § 625.08 (1953)(insurance companies). Generally, as to this type of legislation concerning insurance
companies, see VANCE, INSURANCE 761 (1930).
20. FLA. STAT. § 66.08 (1953),
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personalty," enforce decrees of alimony22  and in garnishment pro-
ceedings.23 Similar provisions can be found in most other states. 24
The general rule that attorney's fees will not be taxed as costs in the
absence of statute, contract, or agreement is subject, except in New Jersey,25
to only one significant area of exception. This area consists of proceedings
in which a common fund has been increased or protected by the services
of the attorney. The chancery courts have held that it is within their
inherent powers to make an award of attorney's fees out of the fund
in such cases.26
SPECIFIC PROBLEM
The probem of the power to dissolve a corporation in the event
of deadlock has been met by legislation in every state27 except iowa. 28
In all except two of those states, 29 there apparently is no statutory provision
for awarding attorney's fees to the successful petitioner.
Very few cases have been presented for judicial review in which this
problem has been scrutinized. The only litigation that appears to be
on point has arisen in New York'0 and California.a'
The leading New York case, In re Stoll-Meyer Wood Crafter's InC.,3 2
in a proceeding brought under the prototype of the Florida statute,33
held that the court bad no power to make allowance for attorney's fees.
It reasoned that this type of application for dissolution was a "special
21. FLA. STAT. § 66.09 (1953).
22. FLA. STAT. § 65.16 (1953).
23. FLA. STAT. § 77.28 (1953).
24. E.g., NEW YORK CIV. PRAC. ACT § 1512 provides for additional allowances
to plaintiff in actions to foreclose a mortgage, partition real property, adjudicate a will
or other instrument in writing, and writs of attachment.
25. New Jersey has, by statute [N.J. STAT. ANN. Tit. 2, c. 29, § 131 (1941)]
invested its courts of equity with discretionary power to award counsel fees as costs
in all matters before them. See Comment, 44 ILL. L. Rpv. 507, 517 to the effect
that the New Jersey Chancery Courts have not applied this as a general rule.
26. 105 U.S. 527 (1881); 132 Fla. 602, 182 So. 216 (1938) (suit for partnership
accounting); 94 Fla. 817, 114 So. 548 (1927) (suit by a representative of the
beneficiaries for distribution of a trust); 113 Ala. 531, 21 So. 315 (1896) (stockholders
derivative action).
27. lornstein, Voluntary Dissolution-A New Development in Intra Corporate
Abuse, 51 YALE L.j. 64 (1941); e.g., FLA. STAT. § 608.28 (1953); N.Y. CEN.
CORP. LAW §§ 101, 103 (1943); Wis. STAT. § 180.771 (1951).
28. IOWA CoDE § 8402 (1939) authorizes the court to dissolve a corporation
"on good cause shown." This may be construed to cover the situation under
discussion here.
29. New Jersey, under its general discretionary power; see note 25 supra.
There is a possibility that the Louisiana Statutes may be so construed. See in this
connection LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:752.3, and 12:55.4 (1948).
30. Wis. STAT. § 180.773 (3) (1951); Application of Cantelino, 278 App.
Div. 800, 104 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1st Dep't. 1951); In re Stoll-Meyer Woodcrafters, Inc.,
84 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1948); In re Newman (Nu Form Dress Corp.) (Oct. 23, 1945)
(No opinion for publication); Matter of Tarrytown W.P.M. Ry., 133 App. Div. 297,
117 N.Y. Supp. 695 (2d Dep't. 1909).
31. In re St. Clair Estate, 66 Cal. App.2d 964, 153 P.2d 453 (1944).
32. 84 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1948).
33. N.Y. CEN. CORP. LAw §§ 101, 103.
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proceeding" within the contemplation of the Civil Practice Act and since
there was no specific provision contained therein authorizing the allowance,
the court was without power to do so.3 4 As authority for their holding,
the court cited Alatter of Tarrytown,' 5 which case apparently stands for
the proposition that where an action is statutory, the court cannot utilize
its general equity powers to afford relief not authorized within the confines
of said statute. "6  The court in the aforementioned California case 7 did
not allow the taxing of attorney's fees but did say that such awards rest
within the sound discretion of the trial court.
As mentioned previously courts of equity have recognized that when
a party institutes litigation which creates, increases, or priotects a fund
for the benefit of a class of which lie is a member, the fund or property
should be charged with necessary expenses incurred in the litigation;
which includes the reasonable compensation of the plaintiff's lawyer.38
The successful litigant's counsel is thus not being paid by the unsuccessful
party, but rather by the class of which the petitioner is a member.30
This doctrine was first enunciated in creditors' suits. 40  It was felt that
if the one creditor had to pay he might suffer a pecuniary loss while
other creditors sat back and benefited. On the contrary he should be
permitted and invited to play the part of champion of those in common
interest with him.4 1 This principle has been further expanded to apply
to stockholders' actions; almost one half of the states have at least one
reported case in a suit by a stockholder, and all uniformly hold counsel
fees should be allowed. 42
The words of Justice Terrell of the Florida Supreme Court can best
epitomize the position of the court in awarding counsel fees in a class
action: "To hold that those likewise affected . . . cannot be required
to bear their portion of the burden is to admit that equity practice is
effete and has not kept pace with the factual situations that precipitate
litigation.' 43
Of course, these decisions are predicated upon the fact that a benefit
has accrued to the fund, and thus, indirectly, to those who should bear
the burden of the expense. This predicate of necessity exists in the
type of action under study here. For, although the careless language
34. In re Stoll-Meyer Woodcrafters, Inc., at 758.
35. In re Tarrytown W.P.M.Ry., 133 App. Div. 297, 117 N.Y.Supp. 695(2d Dep't 1909).
36. Id. at 696, where the court says:
The power which the court possesses in such proceedings is purely statutory,
and does not depend upon its general equity powers.
37. See note 31 supra.
38. Hornstein, Counsel Fees in Stockholders Derivative Suits, 39 COL. L. REv. 784.
39. Burroughs v. Toxaway Co., 185 Fed. 435, 441 (4th Cir. 1911); Lamar v.
Hall & Wimberly, 129 Fed. 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1904).
40. See note 38 supra.
41. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
42. See note 38 supra.
43. Tenney v. Miami Beach, 11 So.2d 188, 190 (Fla. 1942).
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of some of the statutes would seem to make a dissolution mandatory
in the event of deadlock, the courts have required evidence that the
dissolution would redound to the benefit of the stockholders.44 Thus, a
decree of dissolution is beneficial by virtue of its protection of the fund.
The court may proceed on other theories to support an allowance
of counsel fees to successful petitioners under the dissolution statute.
Application of the rule set forth in many Florida cases 45 which allows
attorney's fees when litigation involves a partnership accounting is a
distinct possibility. This, however, would necessitate a piercing of the
corporate veil. A corporation consisting of two stockholders is susceptible
to this line of reasoning, especially if the dictum in a New York case 46
were to be followed: "In point of fact that most close corporations are
little more than . . . chartered partnerships and should be treated as
such." It is the authors' opinion, however, that the Florida court would
not subscribe to such reasoning.47
A second theory submitted as a possible rationale is that of a partition
suit. Inasmuch as the Florida statutes provide for an award of attorney's
fees in partition suits of real 48 and personal property,49 might not the
court adopt this as a governing and applicable rule?50
CONCLUSION
We feel that the denial of attorney's fees to successful petitioners
under Florida Statutes Section 608.28 would definitely be inequitable. It
would allow one of the two factions of a deadlocked corporation to benefit
materially at the expense of the other. Further, that such an allowance does
not require an unprecedented break in the current policy of the law regarding
attorney fees, but is merely an extension of the use of the inherent
power of equity to allow such fees in situations the equities of which
necessitate it.
Of course, the most feasible way to handle this problem would be
for the legislature to enact an amendment to the present statute correcting
this situation. LAWRENCE I. HOLLANDER
and MICHAEL H. KRAmER
44. E.g. Matter of Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1st Dep't
(1949).
45. E.g. Wade v. Clower, 94 Fla. 817, 114 So. 548 (1927).
46. Ripen v. U.S. Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447, 98 N.E. 855, 856
(1912).
47. Freedman v. Fox, 67 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1953) (This was a suit for dissolution
prior to the enactment of FLA. STAT. § 608.28. The court would not dissolve the
corporation upon the submitted contention that it was in fact a partnership).
48. FLA. STAT. § 66.08 (1953).
49. FLA. STAT. § 66.09 (1953).
50. The theory of allowing attorney's fees in partition suits is that all parties
receive a common benefit from the labors of the attorneys effectuating the partition,
and they should not be permitted to escape the common burden and throw on the
plaintiff the whole of it. Arthaud v. McFerrin, 156 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1941); See
Brickell v. Di Pietro, 152 Fla, 429, 12 So.2d 782 (1943).
